I explore the efficiency properties of a competitive search model with match-specific private information and limited commitment on the workers' side. In a static setting the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient, whereas in a dynamic setting it is constrained inefficient whenever the initial unemployment rate is different from its steady-state level. Inefficiency arises because the workers' outside option becomes endogenous and affects the severity of the distortion due to the informational friction. This generates a novel externality: firms offering contracts at a given time do not internalize their effect on the outside option of workers hired in previous periods.
I. Introduction
It has long been recognized that trade in labor markets is costly and subject to frictions. Firms need to post vacancies, workers spend time journal of political economy searching for jobs, and wages are determined by decentralized contracting. This imposes a departure from the frictionless Walrasian paradigm. A classic question arises: To what extent do decentralized labor markets achieve efficiency? In particular, do they reach an efficient level of unemployment and job creation?
Search theory offers a natural environment to represent decentralized markets with trading frictions. In addressing the efficiency issue, the literature has focused on the bargaining side of the model-that is, on the way in which the worker and the firm split the surplus of the employment relationship. Different assumptions on wage determination can drive different implications in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the classic Mortensen-Pissarides model shows that random matching combined with Nash bargaining introduces a search externality that generically generates inefficiency.
1 On the other hand, Shimer (1996) and Moen (1997) show that efficiency can be restored once an appropriate notion of competition is introduced-that is, when firms post wages and workers direct their search toward the most attractive ones. This form of competition is known as competitive search.
However, the contracting problem of workers and employers is not only about how to divide the surplus generated by the match. A crucial additional problem is that the contracting parties typically have private information necessary to evaluate this surplus, and such information is needed to decide whether starting an employment relationship is profitable. In this paper, I focus on this informational problem and on its impact on efficiency. Specifically, I propose a competitive search model with private information and limited commitment on the workers' side. My main result is that the dynamic competitive search equilibrium is generically constrained inefficient. In particular, the unemployment rate reacts suboptimally to initial shocks. This implies a potential role for government intervention in the presence of labor market fluctuations.
I consider an economy in which employers and workers are both risk neutral and ex ante homogeneous. Employers post contracts and workers direct their search toward them. When a match is formed, the disutility of labor is drawn randomly and observed privately by the worker. Moreover, there is limited commitment on the worker's side, in the sense that the worker cannot be forced to work and is always free to walk away and join the ranks of the unemployed. An employment contract is an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism that ensures that the worker truthfully reveals his information and participates voluntarily in the employment relationship. I begin by char-acterizing the competitive search equilibrium, and I show that the equilibrium contract is equivalent to a wage contract, in which the firm offers a flat wage that the worker can accept or reject. Then, I turn to study constrained efficiency. I define a social planner who faces the same informational and limited commitment constraints of the market economy. Given these and the aggregate resource constraint, the planner decides how many vacancies to open and how to allocate consumption to employed and unemployed workers. In both the competitive equilibrium and the planner problems, I assume that workers who reject the job cannot be distinguished from other unemployed workers.
In a static setting, I show that the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient. By contrast, once I turn to a dynamic setting, I show that the competitive search equilibrium is generically constrained inefficient. The crucial difference between the static and the dynamic environments is that the workers' outside option is exogenously given in the former, whereas in the latter it is endogenously determined as the continuation utility of unemployed workers. When workers have private information, they can appropriate a fraction of the net surplus created in a match, which I refer to as informational rents. The workers' outside option affects the size of these rents and, hence, the distortion driven by the informational problem. Firms who post contracts at time affect the workers' outside option at time t, but they do not take t ϩ 1 into account the informational cost that they impose on contracts designed by other firms at time t. This externality is not internalized by competitive search and is the source of constrained inefficiency. The social planner takes into account the impact of unemployed workers' continuation utility on current contracts and is able to improve upon the equilibrium allocation.
The inefficiency result holds whenever the economy starts at an unemployment rate level different from its steady state. If the initial unemployment rate is above the steady-state level, the mass of unemployed workers who can meet a firm and obtain private information is higher today than tomorrow. Hence, the average informational distortion is also higher today. It follows that the planner would like to reduce job creation tomorrow, in order to reduce the continuation utility of unemployed workers today and increase current job creation. The opposite happens when the initial unemployment rate is below the steady-state level.
The inefficiency in my model is driven neither by the search externality arising in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model nor by suboptimality in private contracting. On the one hand, my model retains the Walrasian spirit of competitive search to abstract from inefficiencies associated with ex post bargaining. On the other hand, I allow for general employment contracts under asymmetric information. Prescott and Townsend (1984) show that, in the presence of private information, competitive markets can decentralize the constrained efficient mechanism. In their paper, however, agents can enter exclusive contracts. In this paper, instead, when workers enter unemployment they become anonymous and free to enter a new contractual relationship. This matching environment is a natural way of introducing dynamic competition among contracts and introduces a novel externality. Such an externality is akin to the pecuniary externalities explored by Arnott and Stiglitz (1987) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) in models of insurance in which side trades are feasible.
This paper is related to the vast literature on search theoretic models of the labor market (see the survey by Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright [2005] ) and, in particular, to models using competitive search, such as Shimer (1996) , Moen (1997) , and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) . A series of papers highlight the robustness of the efficiency properties of competitive search in an environment with full information.
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My paper is also related to a growing body of literature on asymmetric information in search environments. In particular, Shimer and Wright (2004) and Moen and Rosen (2007) analyze labor markets in which trading frictions interact with asymmetric information, using competitive search. However, they neither focus on efficiency nor analyze the transitional dynamics of the equilibrium. Faig and Jerez (2005) propose a theory of commerce in which buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for a product. They define a notion of constrained efficiency similar to the one in this paper, but they focus on the static version of the model, hence obtaining an efficiency result. In a similar spirit, Wolinsky (2005) analyzes the efficiency properties of a sequential procurement model with lack of commitment on the buyer's side and finds inefficient equilibria. However, in his model the inefficiency arises because of contracting restrictions. The fact that the seller's effort is not contractible distorts the buyer's search intensity. In my paper, private contracts are unrestricted, and the inefficiency comes only from a general equilibrium effect.
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, my paper is related to the vast literature on mechanism design with asymmetric information, which goes back to Mirrlees (1971) , Laffont and Maskin (1980) , Myerson (1981) , and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1981) . The novelty of this paper is that it embeds a classic contracting problem with asymmetric information into a search environment. This generates a form of competition among contracts, in the sense that when an informed agent rejects a contract offered by a given principal, he is free to search for a new contract. I assume that the shock that is privately observed by the agents (their type) is match specific and that, after rejecting a contract, agents are anonymous. These two assumptions greatly simplify the analysis by allowing for a recursive representation of the optimal contracting problem and by making the agents' outside option independent of their match-specific type. This differentiates my approach from the literature on agency problems with countervailing incentives (Lewis and Sappington 1989) , in which the agent's type affects his outside option, giving him countervailing incentives to reveal his information. This mechanism is absent in my model because the agent's type is match specific instead of being fixed over time.
This paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, I analyze the static version of the economy. In Section III, I describe the dynamic environment and characterize the dynamic competitive search equilibrium. In Section IV, I describe the welfare properties of the dynamic model and derive the main inefficiency result. In Section V, I explore an economy in which workers have full commitment. Section VI concludes. Finally, the Appendix contains all the proofs that are not present in the text.
II. Static Economy
In this section, I introduce the static version of the economy, define and characterize the competitive search equilibrium, and analyze its efficiency properties.
Environment.-The economy is populated by a continuum of measure 1 of workers and a large continuum of employers. Both workers and employers are risk neutral and ex ante homogeneous. For simplicity, assume that all the workers are initially unemployed. Workers can search freely, whereas employers need to pay a positive entry cost k to post a vacancy. When an employer hires a worker, the match produces y. The value of y is common to all the matches and is exogenously given. However, workers suffer a match-specific disutility from labor v. When a match is formed, v is randomly drawn from the cumulative distribution function , with full support on , and is observed privately
3 The cumulative distribution function is differentia-F (7) ble, with denoting the associated density function, and satisfies the f (7) monotone hazard rate condition, .
At the beginning of the period, employers choose whether to post an employment contract in the space of the feasible contracts. Each C worker observes the contracts posted by active firms and chooses to search for a specific contract. Then, matching takes place and, for each match, the draw v is realized and privately observed by the worker. Next, the worker can decide either to participate in the employment relationship or to walk away and stay unemployed. Unemployed workers obtain utility b. Assume that , in order to make the problem y Ϫ v 1 b interesting.
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Matching frictions.-Trading frictions in the labor market are modeled through random matching.
5 Employers and workers know that their matching probabilities depend on the contract that they, respectively, post and seek. For each contract , let denote the mass of em-C v(C ) ployers offering and the mass of unemployed workers searching C u(C ) for . The mass of matches created is given by a constant returns-to- Thanks to the revelation principle, a contract can be specified as an incentive-compatible and individually rational direct revelation mechanism. The worker reports his type v, and, conditional on this report, the firm hires him with a certain probability and pays him a certain transfer. Incentive compatibility ensures that the worker has the incentive to truthfully reveal his type, and individual rationality guarantees that the worker participates voluntarily in the employment relationship after v has been realized. Individual rationality reflects the limited commitment on the worker's side, corresponding to the typical "at-will" employment contracts enforced in the United States. In contrast, firms can fully commit to the posted contract.
Without loss of generality, I can restrict attention to wage contracts, given by a flat wage , which the worker decides either to accept w ‫ޒ‬ ϩ 4 If , the equilibrium would be characterized by zero trade for any v. y ! b ϩ v 5 Random matching can be interpreted as the result of coordination frictions, as in Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) . 6 With discrete time, this condition ensures that both and are proper m (g) m (g) /g probabilities. 7 The exponential function satisfies these conditions. One can m (g) p 1 Ϫ exp (Ϫg) relax them to include functions with one or two kinks, such as a modified Cobb Douglas of the form . See Guerrieri (2006) . 
This implies that as firms choose the wage posted, they choose at the same time the hiring cutoff . The higher the posted wage, the greater v the chance that a matched worker will accept the job.
It is immediate to see that a wage contract is equivalent to a general contract in which workers reveal v and firms hire only workers with and give a flat positive transfer w to all hired workers and a zerô v ≤ v transfer to all the workers who are not hired. On the one hand, it is straightforward to see that such a contract is incentive compatible and individually rational. All the hired workers obtain the same wage and do not have an incentive to lie, and, by construction, the workers who are hired prefer working over staying unemployed and receiving . On b the other hand, in Section III, I show that any incentive-compatible and individually rational contract that is traded in equilibrium is equivalent to a wage contract. Let me go through the logic of the argument. First, if two types of hired workers could obtain different transfers, the type getting the lowest would pretend to be the other type, violating incentive compatibility. Hence, there must be a flat transfer to all the hired workers. Second, workers' lack of commitment ensures that the transfer to workers who are not hired must be nonnegative. In equilibrium it will actually be zero, given that reducing it does not affect the surplus created by the match, while it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint. Finally, notice that the marginal hired worker must be indifferent between being hired and receiving his outside option. This indifference condition pins down the cutoff such that all the workers witĥv v ≤ v are hired. The monotone hazard rate condition on ensures that F (7) firms never use probabilistic hiring. The formal argument is presented in Section III. In this section, I simply assume that firms can only offer wage contracts.
A. Competitive Search Equilibrium
I now define a competitive search equilibrium in which firms can only post wage contracts.
Definition 1. In a static economy in which firms can only post wage contracts, a competitive search equilibrium is a set of wages together with a function , a function
, and a utility level , satisfying CE ϱ U ‫ޒ‬ ϩ i) employers' profit maximization and free entry: for all , w
with equality if ; CE w W ii) workers' optimal job application: for all , ŵ
and with complementary slackness, where is given
In equilibrium, both firms and workers know the market tightness associated with each wage; that is, they know the tightness function . Employers also know the hiring cutoff function . Notice CE CÊ G (w) V (w) that both these functions are defined for any wage , even if not w ‫ޒ‬ ϩ offered in equilibrium. Given these functions, firms post wages that maximize their ex ante profits, and free entry drives these profits to zero. Moreover, optimal job application ensures that workers look only for wages that maximize their ex ante utility, and optimal job acceptance ensures that, after meeting an employer, a worker will choose to work only if it is better than remaining unemployed. Notice that in equilibrium firms will never post wages that do not guarantee to workers, CE U because they anticipate that they would not otherwise be able to attract any worker.
Generalizing the standard result in the search literature (see Shimer 1996; Moen 1997; Acemoglu and Shimer 1999a) , the competitive search equilibrium is such that the expected utility of the unemployed workers is maximized subject to the zero profit condition for the employer.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique competitive search equilibrium , where . Let and
CE CÊ w p v ϩ b Equilibrium characterization.-There are two crucial frictions in the model: asymmetric information between workers and employers and workers' limited commitment. The first implies that firms cannot price discriminate among workers with different disutility v. The second implies that workers cannot commit to make payments to the firm if they are not hired. The combination of these two frictions implies that I can restrict attention to wage contracts and that . Then, a worker w p v ϩ b of type is exactly indifferent between working and remaining unemv ployed, whereas all the inframarginal workers with strictly prefer v ! v to work and obtain a positive net surplus . It follows that, ex ante, v Ϫ v workers expect to appropriate an average net surplus from the match equal toˆv
I will refer to this expression as workers' expected informational rents. Using this expression, constraint (2) can be rewritten aŝv
This equation shows that the expected net surplus of a match must cover not only the vacancy creation cost, , but also the workers' ingk formational rents.
The equilibrium and solve problem (P1). After replacing con- (2) with (3), I obtain the first-order conditions
͵ [ ]
where l is the multiplier attached to constraint (3). The presence of the terms multiplied by the factor in the expressions above l/(1 ϩ l) is due to the workers' informational rents and generates a distortion in the equilibrium allocation. In particular, the presence of the informa-tion constraint (3) introduces a wedge between the equilibrium values and and the first-best values and that maximize the ex
It is immediate that and satisfy conditions (4) and (5) with FB FB v g . 8 Hence, the equilibrium with asymmetric information would l p 0 achieve the first best only if . However, the next lemma shows l p 0 that this is impossible. In particular, it shows that both and are CE CÊ v g lower than their first-best counterparts. In this economy, job creation is equal to and depends positively both on the matching probm (g) F(v) ability and on the hiring margin . Therefore, asymmetric inform (g) v mation unambiguously reduces job creation; that is,
In the static economy, the competitive search equilibrium does not achieve the first-best allocation. Moreover, equilibrium job creation is lower than in the first best.
The distortion comes from the fact that when workers have some informational advantage over the employers, all hired workers need to be paid a flat wage. Hence, to implement the first-best hiring cutoff, the wage should be equal to y. This would imply that the net revenues of any employer after hiring a worker, , would be zero. Given that y Ϫ w employers have to pay ex ante the cost k to open a vacancy, this contradicts the zero profit condition. Lemma 1 highlights the tension between ex ante and ex post efficiency, which keeps the economy away from the first best. Ex post allocative distortions are necessary to induce employers to open vacancies ex ante.
B. Constrained Efficiency
I now define the social planner problem. The planner faces the same frictions present in the market economy: asymmetric information and limited commitment on the workers' side. He does not observe the disutility of the matched workers and cannot force workers to accept a job. If a worker rejects the job, he joins the pool of workers who never received a job offer. Workers who remain unemployed are anonymous; that is, the planner cannot distinguish between workers who have never matched with a firm and workers who have rejected a job. Moreover, unemployed workers cannot commit to make any transfer to the planner. Given these constraints and the aggregate resource constraint, the social planner decides how many vacancies to open at the beginning of the period and chooses how to allocate consumption to employed and unemployed workers. Similarly to the equilibrium analysis, to simplify the exposition, I restrict the planner to offer a flat consumption level to all employed workers, regardless of their type v, and to use a cutoff rule for hiring. In Section IV, I show that this is without loss of generality.
An allocation is described by a consumption level c for employed workers, a consumption level for unemployed workers, a hiring cutoff U C , and a tightness of the market g. The utility of an employed worker v of type v is , whereas that of an unemployed worker is just . After U c Ϫ v C being matched and observing his type, a worker can decide whether to accept the job offer and be hired or to reject it and stay unemployed. Hence, after the match, a worker accepts to work if and only if -that is, , where
Limited commitment implies that an unemployed worker can always choose to keep b, which requires that . Finally, the resource con-U C ≥ b straint for the static economy ensures that aggregate consumption is covered by aggregate net resources-that is,
I can now define a constrained efficient allocation. Given that all the workers are initially unemployed, the social welfare coincides with the ex ante value of being unemployed.
Definition 2. A constrained efficient allocation maximizes the workers' ex ante utilityˆv
subject to the optimal participation constraint (6), the resource constraint (7), and the limited commitment constraint .
U C ≥ b
It is straightforward to show that the resource constraint holds with equality. After substituting it into the objective (8), the planner problem can then be rewritten asˆv
, and . The only difference with problem (P1) is that U Û v p c Ϫ C C ≥ b the planner can potentially transfer resources to the unemployed workers and make their consumption level higher than b. However, given that does not appear in the objective function, the planner will U C choose to keep it at the minimum feasible level b in order to relax as much as possible constraint (9). This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the static economy, a competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient.
C. Money Burning
I now propose a simple exercise to introduce the mechanism that will lead to dynamic inefficiency. Suppose that b can be destroyed. I now show that destroying b, which I call money burning, can increase the workers' ex ante utility.
Proposition 3.
There exists an open set of the parameter space for which the workers' ex ante utility is decreasing in b.
Notice that b represents the workers' outside option, which is exogenous in the static setting. The proof in the Appendix shows that the workers' ex ante utility is decreasing in b whenever . This expression represents the effect of
the workers' outside option on welfare. There is a direct positive effect coming from the fact that as the outside option is higher, workers who end up unemployed are better off. This is captured by , which represents the ex ante probability of being
unemployed at the end of the period. However, there is a negative indirect effect coming from the fact that as b increases, the wage has to increase for all workers, tightening the information constraint (3). This effect is captured by . When 
This result suggests that a planner who could affect the workers' outside option could improve upon the competitive equilibrium allocation. This will be crucial in the welfare analysis of the dynamic model, in which the workers' outside option will become an endogenous object.
III. Dynamic Economy
Environment.-Consider an economy with infinite horizon and discrete time. Both workers and employers have linear preferences and discount factor b. The search and production technologies are natural generalizations of the static setting. Each match lasts until separation, which happens according to a Poisson process with parameter s, while y and now denote the expected present value of output and disutility v at the moment of the match.
9 At the beginning of each time t, workers can be either employed or unemployed and employers can be either active or inactive. Inactive employers can open a vacancy at a cost k, which entitles them to post an employment contract. Invoking the revelation principle, without loss of generality I can restrict attention to the set of incentive-compatible and individually rational direct rev-Q t elation mechanisms at time t.
10 A contract posted at time t is a map :
, specifying the hiring probability and
the expected present value of transfers from the employer q(v) ‫ޒ‬ t ϩ to the worker for each matched worker at time t who reports type .
11 v Notice that the transfer profile over the life of the relationship is irrelevant for the analysis, given that workers are risk neutral, types are fixed over time within a match, and there is no commitment problem after the match is implemented. Notice that contracts cannot be conditioned on the past employment history, since I assume that unemployed workers are anonymous.
Let be the set of contracts posted by active firms. Each un-‫ރ‬ O Q t t employed worker observes and applies for a contract . Similarly ‫ރ‬ C ‫ރ‬ t t t to the static setting, each contract is associated with a specific so C g t t that employers and workers know that their matching probabilities will depend on the contract that they, respectively, post and seek. When matching takes place, the draw v is realized and is observed by the worker. Then, the worker chooses a report and whether to participatẽ v in the employment relationship. If he walks away or is not matched, he enters an anonymous pool of unemployed workers, gets b, and searches for a job in the next period. If the worker is hired, the match is productive until separation. Notice that, in order to ensure nonzero job creation, I assume that , where
Bellman values.-Let denote the expected utility for a worker v (v, v) t 9 Let the instantaneous output and disutility be and , which are both constant for y v the duration of the match. Then, and .
The set is time varying because the outside option for unemployed workers is Q t potentially changing over time.
11 More generally, could depend not only on the report but also on whether orq (v) v of type v, matched at time t, and reporting type -that is, ṽ˜˜˜ṽ
For analytical convenience it is useful to split into three comv(v, v) t ponents as follows: (i) unemployed. The value reflects the possibility of being separated and V t becoming unemployed in future periods, and it satisfies the recursion
( 1 1 )
Moreover, the value satisfies
An employment contract is incentive compatible whenever
t t and individually rational whenever
Following a standard result in the mechanism design literature (e.g., see Laffont and Tirole 1993) , I can reduce the dimensionality of the constraints. In particular, conditions (IC) and (IR) are equivalent to being nonincreasing together with the following two conditions for e(7) t :
This allows me to separate the problem of finding an optimal hiring schedule from the problem of finding a wage schedule that e(7) q(7)
A. Dynamic Competitive Search Equilibrium
In this section, I define the dynamic version of a competitive search equilibrium, when there are no restrictions on the contracts that firms can post. Such a competitive search equilibrium is a sequence of sets of incentive-compatible and individually rational contracts and
a sequence of tightness functions , where , such
that, at any t, employers maximize profits and workers apply optimally for jobs. At time t, both workers and employers take as given the sequence of tightness functions and of sets of posted contracts
I define the equilibrium in recursive terms. The crucial thing to notice is that the pair of continuation utilities for unemployed and employed workers at time , , and are sufficient statistics for the future
sets of posted contracts and tightness functions . This
allows me to use the following definition. Definition 3. In the dynamic economy, a symmetric competitive search equilibrium is a sequence of sets of incentive-compatible and individually rational contracts ; a sequence of functions ,
where ; and a bounded sequence of continuation util-
i) employers' profit maximization and free entry at each time t: for all , for given and ,
with equality if ; and
ii) workers' optimal job application at each time t: for all C { t , for given and ,
and with complementary slackness, where
or if is empty, and
In equilibrium, both firms and workers take as given the continuation utilities of employed and unemployed workers and the tightness function that associates a market tightness with each potential contract, including those not offered in equilibrium. Moreover, profits are driven to zero at each point in time by free entry. Similarly to the static environment, at time t firms will never post contracts that do not guarantee to the workers, because they anticipate that otherwise they would CE U t not be able to attract any worker.
The next proposition gives a characterization of a competitive search equilibrium in recursive terms.
Proposition 4. If is a competitive search
equilibrium, then any pair with and
satisfies the following:
i) at any time t, and solve
subject to , the constraints (IC ) and (IR ), together e (v) [0, 1] t with the monotonicity assumption on , and the free-entry
ii) the sequences and satisfy equations (11)
and (12).
Conversely, if a sequence solves problem (P3) at any t
and satisfy (11) and (12), then there exists an equilibrium
such that and .
The next proposition shows that the analysis of the competitive search equilibrium can be substantially simplified, given that it is possible to restrict attention to wage contracts without loss of generality, as I did in the static economy. Recall that a wage contract is equivalent to a direct revelation mechanism characterized by a hiring cutoff rule, a flat transfer paid to the hired workers, and a zero transfer for all the workers who are not hired.
Proposition 5. Take any and that solve problem (P3) for given C g t t and . The contract takes the form of a wage
where and the pair is the uniquêŵ
solution to the following problem:
t t t ϩ1 tϩ1 g t Equilibrium characterization.-The previous proposition shows that without loss of generality I can restrict attention to wage contracts. In particular, notice that in the dynamic setting the characterization of the equilibrium allocation at time t for given is analogous to the
static one, where b is replaced by , given that the value
of remaining unemployed is now and that an employed worker b ϩ bU tϩ1 gets, in addition to the wage net of disutility, the discounted continuation utility . Similarly to the static setting, constraint (14) can be bV tϩ1 rewritten asˆv
This constraint is the analog of the information constraint (3) and requires that the expected net surplus of a match created at time t covers both the vacancy creation cost and the workers' expected gk t informational rents .
For given , the equilibrium values and solve problem
(P3 ), and the analysis is similar to the static case. After replacing constraint (14) with (15), I obtain the first-order conditions
[ ] where is the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint (15). The l t analog to lemma 1 can be proved in the dynamic setting to show that and that the equilibrium is away from the first-best allocation.
In a dynamic economy, competition among firms posting contracts at time t leads to an allocation that is analogous to the static one, except that now the workers' outside option is an equilibrium object. This outside option captures an additional channel of competition among contracts posted at different points in time: a worker who rejects a contract offered by a given firm at time t is free to search for a new contract at time . Firms and workers at time t take as given the t ϩ 1 continuation utilities and that summarize the effect of the U V tϩ1 tϩ1
equilibrium contracts offered in all future periods. The function , defined in proposition 5, denotes the maximized net
surplus of a match at time t for given , which represents the
net outside option of the unemployed workers. Using the laws of motion (11) and (12) 
where the function is defined in proposition 5, then the equilibrium F (7) is unique.
I have imposed condition (18) in order to rule out the possibility of cycles. This condition essentially rules out situations in which the distortion generated by asymmetric information is too large. More specifically, the left-hand side of condition (18) represents the effect of a change in the expected utility of future unemployed on the expected utility of current unemployed. Notice that if this effect is negative and strong enough, it is possible to have cycles in which periods with low expected utility for the unemployed are followed by periods of high expected utility. The term is equal to , where
is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the information constraint l t (14) and represents the impact of an increase in the outside option of the unemployed on the maximized net surplus of a current match. This impact is negative because of two effects: the relative advantage of creating a match is lower, and the unemployed workers can extract larger informational rents; that is, the information constraint is tighter. Condition (18) can be rewritten as
straightforward to see that if there is no informational problem and , condition (18) is always satisfied and cycles are not possible. l p 0 t Notice that as long as , condition (18) is sat-
. However, the money-burning result in Section l 1 0 t II.C shows that this may not be the case if the informational distortion is sufficiently strong. Hence, condition (18) imposes a bound on the strength of the informational distortion. One can show that condition (18) is satisfied for a wide range of plausible parameterizations. In the rest of the paper I will assume that (18) holds.
The characterization of the competitive search equilibrium immediately implies that the only nontrivial transitional dynamics in the economy are those of the unemployment rate:
In the steady state, not only are w, , g, V, and U constant, but so is thê v unemployment rate. The steady-state unemployment rate is given by
IV. Dynamic Efficiency
In this section, I explore the efficiency properties of the dynamic competitive search equilibrium. I characterize the social planning problem and show the main result of the paper: the competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient whenever the initial unemployment rate is different from its steady-state level.
A. Social Planning Problem
As in the static setting, the social planner does not observe the disutilities of the matched workers and has to induce them to truthfully reveal them. Moreover, workers have limited commitment, in the sense that they can always decide to remain in the anonymous pool of the unemployed and enjoy b. The planner faces the same anonymity restriction present in the decentralized economy: if a worker enters the unemployment pool, his history is indistinguishable from that of any other unemployed worker. Given these constraints, together with the resource constraint of the economy, the social planner decides how many vacancies to open at the beginning of each period, which jobs to create, and how to intertemporally allocate consumption to employed and unemployed workers. An allocation is a sequence of functions representing thẽ {e(v)}t vV hiring decision of a worker who meets an employer at time t and reports type , a sequence of functions denoting the expectedṽ {c(v)}t vV present value of the consumption of the same worker, a sequence U C t of consumption values for unemployed workers, and a sequence of tightness values . Notice that, as in the equilibrium, the consumption g t profile over the employment relationship is irrelevant for the analysis, given that agents have linear utility, types are fixed over time within a match, and there is no commitment problem after the match is implemented.
Once a worker is matched at time t and observes his disutility v, he decides the report and expects utilitỹ ṽ˜˜ṽ ployed, net of consumption and disutility, and represents the expected present value of being separated and becoming unemployed in the future. It satisfies the recursion
Finally, if the worker is not hired, he gets the unemployment transfer and enjoys , where represents the continuation utility of
remaining unemployed and satisfies
As in the equilibrium analysis, an allocation is incentive compatible when is nonincreasing and e (7)
Workers' limited commitment imposes that matched workers always prefer to participate in the employment relationship rather than staying unemployed-that is,
Moreover, it requires that unemployed workers can always choose to enjoy b-that is, .
The social planner can transfer resources intertemporally at the interest rate . Then, the intertemporal resource constraint ensures
Ϫ1
b Ϫ 1 that the expected present value of aggregate consumption is covered by the expected present value of aggregate output and takes the form
where follows the law of motion 
B. General Characterization: Dual Problem
In order to analyze the constrained efficient allocations, it is convenient to approach the social planner problem from a dual perspective-that is, to maximize the net resources subject to and forP
given and . This problem can be characterized in recursive terms.Ū V The planner's Bellman equation, at time t, is a function of three state variables: the promised utility to employed workers, ; the promised V t utility to unemployed workers, ; and the unemployment rate, . The U u t t planning problem can be written as
subject to the promise-keeping constraints for and , (22) and (23); V U t t the law of motion for , (27); the incentive-compatibility constraints, u t summarized by (24) and nonincreasing; and the participation cone (7) t straints, (25) and . Given the value function for a
given , if is on the Pareto frontier, it must be that¯¯ū (U, V ) P(V, U, 0 and that is monotone decreasing in the first two u ) p 0 P (7, 7, 7)
Proposition 7. The constrained efficient allocation {e (7) , c (7) , t t is characterized by
where and , , and solve the problem
subject to (22), (27), , and
Proposition 7 shows that asymmetric information induces the planner to offer a flat consumption level to all the employed workers, regardless of their type v. This implies, similarly to the equilibrium analysis, that workers with disutility v lower than appropriate â v t positive net surplus equal to when they are hired at time t. v Ϫ v t Equation (28) comes from the combination of the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints. It shows that the continuation utility of unemployed workers depends on their expected informational rents, , which are increasing with job creation,
both at the matching and at the hiring margin.
Next, I show the main result of this paper: the competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient whenever the initial unemployment rate is different from its steady-state level.
Proposition 8. In the dynamic economy, if , then the SS u ( u 0 competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient. The crucial difference between the static and the dynamic environment is that the workers' outside option is exogenously given in the former, whereas it is endogenously determined in the latter. Inefficiency arises because firms do not internalize the fact that the workers' outside option affects the workers' informational rents for other firms. The social planner can internalize this informational externality and thus achieve a Pareto improvement.
Let me sketch the mechanism behind this result, leaving the general proof to the Appendix. Let be the Lagrange multiplier associated u h t t with constraint (28). Notice that the planner promises the same value to a mass of unemployed workers. Hence, represents the shadow U u h cost of increasing for each unemployed worker. It is possible to show U t that when information is asymmetric, is smaller than one. On the one h t hand, when increases by one unit, the planner has to give one unit U t more to each unemployed worker. On the other hand, by constraint (28), this allows the planner to increase the informational rents of the workers at time t, increasing job creation and hence increasing the net social surplus. The difference reflects the benefit coming from 1 Ϫ h t this second effect and can be interpreted as the shadow value per worker of relaxing the informational distortion. Now, consider a planner at date 0 who is choosing optimally and U 1 suppose, for simplicity, that all workers start unemployed-that is,
. If the planner increases , this affects the promise-keeping u p 1 U 0 1 constraint (28) for the workers hired both at time 0 and at time 1, given that appears on the right-hand side of the constraint in period 0 U 1 and on the left-hand side of the same constraint in period 1. In particular, the expected informational rents of the workers and, hence, job creation have to decrease at time 0, whereas they can increase at time 1. This implies that the planner sustains the informational cost 1 Ϫ h 0 per worker unemployed at time 0 and enjoys the informational benefit per worker unemployed at time 1. The planner's first-order con-1 Ϫ h 1 dition with respect to reduces to where denotes the Lagrangian associated with the planner's prob-L lem.
13 Now suppose by contradiction that the competitive equilibrium solves the planner problem. Recall that the equilibrium allocation, except for the unemployment rate, is constant over time. Using the firstorder conditions with respect to and , one can show that should v g h t t t be constant over time as well; that is, for all t. Then, from equation
that the planner could locally improve upon the competitive equilibrium by decreasing , given that .
The argument is more general than this specific example. A perturbation argument shows that whenever , the planner can improve
upon the equilibrium by reducing . 14 The intuition is that, in this U tϩ1 case, a reduction in leads to an increase in the informational rents U tϩ1 for a mass of unemployed workers at time t, which is larger relative u t to the mass of unemployed workers at time , whose informational t ϩ 1 rents are depressed by a reduction in . Since at the competitive U tϩ1 equilibrium the shadow value of information per worker is constant, the total benefit at time t of reducing is higher than the total cost U tϩ1 experienced at time t. Symmetrically, when , there is a gain u ! u t t ϩ1 from increasing .
U tϩ1
This suggests that the direction of the inefficiency depends on the initial conditions of the economy. In particular, when the initial unemployment rate is above its steady-state level, then equation (27) implies that the unemployment rate is decreasing over time. Then, at any time t, the planner has an incentive to reduce , thus increasing job U tϩ1 creation and speeding up the convergence of the unemployment rate to the steady state. On the other hand, when the initial unemployment rate is below its steady-state level, the reverse applies.
Finally, if the initial unemployment rate is at its steady-state level, then the competitive search equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions of 13 To derive expression (29), use the first-order condition and the envelope condition with respect to , together with the law of motion (27) .
U 1 14 Note that if , when changes, must also adjust to satisfy the promise-
keeping constraint for . In turn, this requires to change as well. This is why it is V U t t ϩ2
easier to make the perturbation argument at with . The perturbation argut p 0 u p 1 0 ment for the general case is available on request.
the social planning problem. In this case, the mass of unemployed workers is constant over time, and the externality described above is muted.
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V. Full Commitment
An essential ingredient for the inefficiency result discussed above is the assumption of limited commitment on the workers' side. To illustrate the role of this condition, let me now consider an environment with full commitment. The money-burning exercise in Section II.C shows that if the planner can wastefully destroy b, in some cases he can obtain a Pareto improvement. When there is no commitment problem, both the planner and the private economy can do better than that, since they can take resources away from workers who do not work and redistribute them. Hence, they can reduce the workers' outside option without wasting aggregate resources.
When there is no problem of commitment, workers can fully commit to pay b to firms before observing their type. Hence, the individual rationality constraint (IR ) becomes
Hence, the optimal wage schedule takes the form of a flat wage for hired workers and a flat application fee z for all the matched workersthat is,
where . Feasibility imposes . After the
z ≤ b match, the firm asks the worker to pay an application fee z before he observes the realization of the shock. If the worker is hired, he will receive the wage, net of the fee-that is, -whereas if he is not w Ϫ z hired, he will just pay the fee z. This implies that if the unemployed workers have enough resources, they can commit ex ante to pay for the option of seeing their realization v and, hence, can subsidize the informational rents that the employers will have to pay to the workers whom they effectively hire. In the next proposition, I show that when b is sufficiently large, the competitive search equilibrium can achieve the first-best allocation.
Proposition 9. Suppose that there is full commitment on the work-ers' side and that the following inequality holds:
Then the competitive search equilibrium achieves the first-best allocation.
A fortiori, the social planner can restore the first-best allocation. Actually, the planner can do so for a larger set of parameters than the market economy can. The difference comes from the fact that firms cannot extract resources from workers they do not meet, whereas the social planner can impose a tax on all the workers, even those not matched. 16 Formally, under full commitment, can be smaller than U C b, as long as .
U C ≥ 0 Proposition 10. Suppose that there is full commitment on the workers' side and the following inequality holds:
Then the first-best allocation can be decentralized by subsidizing job creation with a lump-sum tax on workers, both employed and unemployed.
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When there are enough resources in the economy, full commitment restores efficiency, in the specific sense that both the equilibrium and the planner achieve the first-best allocation. However, as soon as the equilibrium is away from the first-best allocation, the constrained inefficiency result applies.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, I have explored the efficiency properties of decentralized labor markets characterized by bilateral contracting, asymmetric information, and workers' limited commitment. I have shown that the equilibrium unemployment dynamics are typically constrained inefficient and that there is a role for the government to improve upon the equilibrium.
A natural extension of the model would be to add aggregate shocks. A business-cycle interpretation of the results would suggest that decentralized economies react inefficiently to recessions and booms. In par- 16 Allowing for a broader interpretation of competitive search, I could think of market makers who impose an application fee on all the workers who search for a match. This delivers a problem that is equivalent to the one of the social planner. In this case, the competitive search equilibrium will be able to restore the full information allocation exactly for the same set of parameters as those of the social planner. 17 An isomorphic policy to implement the full information allocation would be to transfer resources directly from unemployed to employed workers. ticular, the analysis seems to indicate that there is insufficient creation when the economy recovers from a recession and excessive creation when the economy slows down after a boom. Imagine that the economy is at the steady state and is hit by a temporary negative shock, which pushes the unemployment rate above its steady-state level. After the shock, the planner would like to speed up the convergence toward the original steady state. In terms of policy, this would mean that countercyclical subsidies to job creation could be an optimal response to temporary cyclical shocks. An interesting area for future research is to introduce explicitly aggregate shocks in the model and to study its implications for optimal policy over the business cycle.
The matching environment, together with the anonymity assumption for unemployed workers, provides a useful setting to study competition among nonexclusive contracts. In this context, the inefficiency result is driven by the endogenous nature of the workers' outside option. Firms offering contracts in the future do not internalize the fact that they affect the outside option of unemployed workers who meet other firms today. I believe a similar externality can arise in other models of decentralized contracting. It would be interesting to explore its effects in alternative applications, such as financial markets or monetary economies.
and, given (A1), it follows that , and so . Then, com-CE CE m(G (w)) ! m(g) G (w) ! g bining this with profit maximization and optimal job acceptance, it follows that
This implies that violates (2), completing the first step of the proof. {w, v, g}
Step 2: This step shows that for any , such that solves
, there is an equilibrium
, and . Let . b ϩ v {W , V , G , U } cation for jobs and the optimal job acceptance decision.
To complete the proof, I now show that it also satisfies the firms' profit maximization. Suppose by contradiction that some triple violates
and imply that
so that the triple satisfies all the constraints but generates a higher CÊ {w, V (w) , g} value for the objective function, giving a contradiction.
Step 3: In this step, I show that there exists a unique solution to problem (P1). This completes the proof, given that, from the previous two steps, it implies that the unique solution to (P1) together with equation (1) characterizes the unique competitive search equilibrium.
First, let me show that there exists a solution to problem (P1). It is straightforward to see that the objective function of problem (P1) is continuous inv and g and that the constraint set is compact, sinceˆ(m (g) /g)(y Ϫ v Ϫ b)F(v) Ϫ k is continuous in both its arguments and is not empty, given that, for example, and any satisfies it. Existence follows directly. g p 0 v Next, let me prove that this solution is unique. A solution to problem (P1) is an array that satisfies the necessary conditions (3), (4), and (5).
CE CÊ (v , g , l) Notice that equation (4) implicitly defines as a function of l with .v Ѩv/Ѩl ! 0 This implicit function can be substituted into equations (3) and (5), givinĝ v (l) two equations in two unknowns, g and l:
After solving for g and l, can be derived using (4). Notice that and v f (g, l)
1 implicitly define two functions, which I name and . Then,
using the implicit function theorem, it follows that at the equilibrium
given that . It follows
p 0 that the two curves must intersect at most once. Moreover, given that I have already proved existence, they must intersect exactly at one point, proving that there exists a unique pair that solves problem (P1). Hence, there exists
, and, given the previous steps, there exists a unique CE CÊ w p v ϩ b competitive search equilibrium, completing the proof. QED
Proof of Lemma 1
First, let me show that problem (P1) is equivalent to the same problem in which constraint (2) is replaced by
Let be the multiplier attached to this constraint. By contradiction, assume l ≥ 0 that the solution to this problem is a pair with . Then, thê (v, g) l p 0 necessary first-order condition with respect to takes the same form as in v problem (P1), equation (4), with -that is, . Substituting this intô
. This implies that and, k 1 0 l 1 0 hence, that (A2) must be binding. Given that, by proposition 1 the solution to problem (P1) is unique. It follows that the two problems are equivalent and that the solution to (P1) is fully characterized by (2), (4), and (5) with . l 1 0 The first statement of the lemma follows immediately.
To prove the second statement, notice that immediately implies that l 1 0 by equation (4). Moreover, this implies that
where the second inequality follows because for all . (5) 
Proof of Proposition 3
First, using the envelope condition, notice that the workers' ex ante utility at the competitive search equilibrium is decreasing in b whenever 1 Ϫ . For convenience, define . Hence, to 
where, from (A7), 
Proof of Proposition 6
Step 1: Existence.
First, notice that with the use of propositions 4 and 5 the dynamic competitive search equilibrium can be equivalently characterized as follows:
Step 2: Uniqueness. First, notice that by definition and represent the continuation utility of V U t t employed and unemployed workers. This immediately implies that they are nonnegative. Moreover, in any equilibrium, the per-period wage [1 Ϫ b (1 Ϫ must be bounded above by the firm's per-period output .
The maximum expected utility that a worker can obtain at any point in time t is then bounded above by (recall that I assume 
